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ABSTRACT Payment channel networks are the most developed proposal to address the well-known issue
of blockchain scalability. Currently, the Lightning Network (LN) is the mainstream and most used payment
channel network. In a previous work we introduced CLoTH, a payment channel network simulator we
developed to analyze capabilities and limitations of such networks. In this work, using CLoTH, we present
results of three groups of simulations on a recent snapshot of the LN, aimed to shed a light on the following
aspects. Firstly, we investigated how hubs influence the LNperformance. Then, we analyzed the effectiveness
of two different channel rebalancing approaches, an active and a passive one. Eventually, we studied
performance of the LN when a few service-providers nodes receive payments from the other network nodes,
which is a typical use case of payment channel networks. We found that the LN is resilient to the removal
of hubs, that our passive rebalancing approach reduces of about one fourth the payments failures due to
channel unbalancing, and that in the service-providers scenario a consistent part of payments fails because
channels directing to the service providers become unbalanced. Our work contributes to prove the strengthen
of the Lightning Network when removing hubs and its weakness in the service-provider scenario. In addition,
the passive rebalancing approach proposed in this work is a good candidate for the implementation in the
Lightning Network protocol to mitigate channel unbalancing.
INDEX TERMS Bitcoin, blockchain, blockchain scalability, lightning network, payment channel, payment
channel network, simulator.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency that allows parties to trans-
act without any trusted central entity [1]. It relies on the
blockchain, a distributed public ledger which registers all
Bitcoin economic transactions. Bitcoin and other blockchain-
based cryptocurrencies do not scale. The replication of the
ledger and the synchronization mechanism of the replicas,
in fact, entail a capped transaction throughput [2].
Payment channels are the most explored technical propos-
als that address the blockchain scalability issue [3]–[9]. They
enable off-chain payments, i.e., payments that do not need
to be registered on the blockchain and thus are not subject
to the blockchain throughput limit. A payment channel is a
two-party ledger which is updated off-chain: the two involved
parties can bidirectionally exchange an unbounded number
of off-chain payments through the channel. The blockchain
is only used to open/close channels and does not register
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Guangjie Han.
the payments that take place in the channels during their
lifetime.
Two-party payment channels can be linked together to
build a payment channel network (PCN). This allows parties
not directly connected by a payment channel to send/receive
off-chain payments which are routed across linked payment
channels.
The Lightning Network (LN) [3], namely, the payment
channel network built for Bitcoin, is the most developed
and used PCN. In fact, at the time of writing, the LN is
constituted by more than 9 thousands nodes and more than
30 thousands payment channels, with around 900 bitcoins in
the network (being worth more than 9 millions of dollars).
The Lightning Network is an HTLC-based PCN. The HTLC
(which stands for Hashed Timelock Contract) is a contract
that allows the transfer of off-chain payments across multiple
payment channels in a trustless way.
At its current state of development, the Lightning Net-
work presents critical features that might undermine its cor-
rect functioning and therefore need to be investigated and
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improved. Some examples of these critical features are chan-
nel economic capacity, which limits payment amounts, chan-
nel unbalancing, which makes payment channels unusable in
one direction, and uncooperative behavior of nodes, which
causes increased payment time and failures.
In a previous work [10], we introduced CLoTH, an original
simulator for HTLC payment channel networks [10]. CLoTH
takes parameters defining a payment network (e.g., number of
channels per node, average channel capacity) and parameters
defining payments (e.g., payment amounts and payment rate)
as input. On the base of these input parameters, it simulates
the payments on the HTLC payment network. It produces
performance measures in terms of payment-related statistics,
such as payment failure probability and time to complete
payments.
In this paper we conducted simulations on the Lightning
Network using CLoTH. The specific objective of the study
is to analyze the effect of hubs, rebalancing approaches and
service providers on the Lightning Network performance.
Therefore, we performed the following three separate groups
of simulations providing a recent snapshot of the LN as input
to CLoTH.
1) Simulations on hubs. In the Lightning Network there
are hubs, i.e., nodes which have an high number of open
payment channels. We removed the most connected
hubs from the LN to understand how hubs influence
the LN performance
2) Simulations on rebalancing.We implemented rebalanc-
ing approaches, i.e., approaches that aim to mitigate
channel unbalancing. We ran simulations in order to
analyze the effectiveness of these approaches.
3) Simulations on service providers. The service-providers
scenario is a typical case of use of the Lightning
Network, in which a few nodes in the network (service
providers) are payees only, as they are paid for their
services. The majority of network nodes, instead, are
payers only, as they send payments to the service
providers. The goal of these simulations is to under-
stand whether the LN can support this typical use case
in which most of the payments are directed to only a
few service-providers nodes.
The main findings resulting from the above-described sim-
ulations are:
• The Lightning Network is resilient to the removal of
the most connected hubs, as the probability of payment
success do not significantly decrease when the hubs are
removed.
• A rebalancing approach proposed in this work reduces
by one fourth the probability of payment failures for
unbalancing.
• In the service-providers scenario, channels directing to
the service providers become unbalanced, thus produc-
ing a relevant number of payment failures.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
In Section II we provide the necessary background on Bitcoin
and the Lightning Network. In Section III we briefly present
the main features of the CLoTH simulator. In Section IV,
we illustrate the study design, describing some exploratory
simulations. In Sections V, VI and VII, we describe the
simulations on hubs, rebalancing and service providers
respectively, including the simulation results. Finally, in
Section VIII, we provide conclusions and delineate future
work.
II. BACKGROUND
In this Section we provide the background on Bitcoin,
the blockchain (and its scalability issue) and the payment
channel networks.
A. BITCOIN AND THE BLOCKCHAIN
Bitcoin is a digital payment system running on a peer-to-
peer network with no central authority. A Bitcoin transaction
allows parties to exchange Bitcoin currency (whose unity is
known as bitcoin, symbol BTC). A transaction is made of
inputs and outputs. An output contains the bitcoins trans-
ferred and a locking script, which codes the conditions nec-
essary to spend the bitcoins contained in the output. An input
is a reference to a previous output and an unlocking script
that satisfies the spending conditions and spends the bitcoins
contained in the referenced output.
To prevent double-spending, all Bitcoin transactions are
registered in the blockchain, a distributed public ledger. It is
called ‘‘blockchain’’ because its structure is a chain of blocks.
A block is a collection of transactions. Each block has a
reference to the previous block, thus creating a chain.
Each Bitcoin peer (that runs a full node) stores a copy of the
entire blockchain. A distributed consensus protocol is used
to keep consistent all the blockchain replicas. The Bitcoin
distributed consensus protocol is based on a computational
intensive crypto-puzzle and on economic incentives. On aver-
age every ten minutes, a Bitcoin peer (called miner) finds a
solution to the crypto-puzzle, known as Proof ofWork, which
grants him the right to add a new block to the blockchain.
If the block is valid and contains valid transactions, the miner
receives as a reward freshly minted bitcoins; otherwise, the
block is rejected by the Bitcoin network. Therefore, economic
incentives incentivize miners to produce valid blocks. Such
distributed consensus protocol constitutes the key novelty of
Bitcoin, as it works in a decentralized environment: each
Bitcoin peer, without being trusted and identified, manages
the blockchain and validates new transactions.
B. THE ISSUE OF SCALABILITY
In Bitcoin the transaction throughput is capped to a maximum
of around seven transactions per seconds [11]. Such transac-
tion throughput is far lower than the thousands of transactions
per second which world-wide payment systems are supposed
to support [12]. This prevents Bitcoin from scaling.
The transaction throughput is capped by the maximum
block size allowed in Bitcoin. The reason of imposing a
block size limit is to contain the bandwidth, computational
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and storage cost of storing the blockchain, validating and
transmitting transactions. In this way, the decentralization
degree is kept high, as an high number of peers is able to
store, validate and transmit blocks and transactions [13].
Different solutions have been proposed to address the scal-
ability issue:
• Re-parametrization of the block parameters, namely,
reduction of the inter-block latency and/or increase of
the maximum block size. It has been proved [13], [14]
that, if an high decentralization degree of the system is
an essential requirement, re-parameterization does not
significantly increase transaction throughput.
• Alternative consensus protocol (such as Proof of Stake
[15], [16]) which aim at replacing the Proof of Work and
at increasing the rate at which new blocks of transactions
are produced. The security properties of alternative con-
sensus protocol constitute an open research question.
• Sharding [17], [18], which consist in distributing por-
tions of the blockchain to multiple sets of nodes,
so that not every node has to store and manage the
entire blockchain. Whether sharding approaches pre-
serve blockchain decentralization is an open research
question.
• Payment channel networks (PCNs), which solve the
scalability issue by moving off-blockchain as many pay-
ments as possible. In fact, throughput of off-chain pay-
ments is not capped by themaximum block size, as those
payments do not need to be stored on the blockchain.
PCNs seem to constitute the most promising solution to the
scalability issue, as they could not significantly compromise
blockchain security and decentralization. They could enable
payments that, with respect to transactions registered on the
blockchain, are: cheaper, as lower fees are required than the
fees for on-blockchain transactions; faster, as they do not
need to be registered on the blockchain; and more privacy
preserving, as they are not visible in the public blockchain.
C. PAYMENT CHANNEL NETWORK
Apayment channel is a two-party channel in which the parties
exchange off-chain payments. A payment channel network
is a network of payment channels where off-chain payments
are routed. A PCN constitutes a second layer, on top of the
blockchain: the latter is only used to open and close payment
channels.
The Lightning Network [3] is the mainstream PCN, built
on top of the Bitcoin blockchain. The LN protocol specifies
how to open payment channels and to route off-chain pay-
ments across a network of payment channels.
Assume a payment channel between Alice and Berto.
Assume that Alice allocates 0.5 BTC in the channel and Berto
allocates 0.5 BTC in the channel: the initial balance of Alice
in the channel is therefore 0.5 BTC, and the initial balance of
Berto is 0.5 BTC. The total capacity of the channel is the sum
of the two balances, i.e., 1 BTC. The operational cycle of the
payment channel in the Lightning Network is described in the
following.
1) CHANNEL FUNDING
Alice and Berto create a funding transaction, the transac-
tion required to fund the channel. The funding transaction is
broadcast to the blockchain and, when confirmed, the channel
is considered open. Alice and Berto create also a commit-
ment transaction, which represents their respective current
balances in the channel: such transaction spends the bitcoins
in the funding transaction and transfers 0.5 BTC to Alice
and 0.5 BTC to Berto. The commitment transaction is not
broadcast to the blockchain.
2) PAYMENT EXECUTION
When Alice wants to pay 0.1 BTC to Berto, the two parties
create a new commitment transaction which reflects the new
balances: 0.4 BTC of Alice and 0.6 BTC of Berto. No transac-
tion is sent to the blockchain: the operation is done off-chain.
3) CHANNEL CLOSING
When the two parties want to close the channel, they send the
last updated commitment transaction to the blockchain.
4) PUNISHMENT
Berto can punish Alice if Alice misbehaves (or vice versa),
thanks to the Revocable Sequence Maturity Contract
(RSMC), a contract implemented by a script in the spending
condition of the commitment transaction. Alice could be
tempted to broadcast an old commitment to the blockchain,
for instance, the commitment preceding her payment to
Berto, when she owned more funds (0.5 against 0.4 BTC).
If Alice tries to do so and Berto notices the old commitment
transaction in the blockchain, Berto can take all the funds of
the channel (even the 0.4 BTC of Alice’s balance), by broad-
casting the last commitment transactionwith the RSMC to the
blockchain. Therefore, since Alice may lose all her funds, she
is disincentivised to misbehave.
5) UNBALANCING
A channel is said unbalanced when one balance is much
higher than the other. If payments always flow from Alice
to Berto and no payments flow from Berto to Alice, Alice’s
balance may go to zero. Channel unbalancing constitutes a
problem, as a payment cannot traverse a channel in a given
direction if the balance in that direction is lower than the
payment amount.
A network of payment channels allows off-chain payments
even to parties not directly connected by a payment channel.
The Lightning Network is an HTLC-based PCN, as routing of
a payment across multiple channels is done via a specific con-
tract called Hashed Timelock Contract (HTLC). The HTLC
ensures trustlessness: a party involved in a payment route is
guaranteed it does not lose money, even in case the other
parties in the route are not trustworthy and misbehave.
The HTLC implements off-chain conditional payments in
a payment channel. It is coded as a spending condition in the
commitment transaction of a payment channel. When Alice
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establishes an HTLC with Berto of value 0.1 BTC, it means
that Alice will pay Berto 0.1 BTC if Berto shows a certain
value R (called preimage); otherwise, if Berto does not show
R within a certain timeout, the payment does not take place.
In the following we explain the phases of a multihop
payment using HTLCs. For instance, assume that Alice sends
0.1 BTC to Davide traversing the following payment chan-
nels: the channel between Alice and Berto, the channel
between Berto and Carola, the channel between Carola and
Davide.
6) HTLC ESTABLISHMENT
For the multi-hop payment originated by Alice and trying to
reach Davide, the following HTLCs are established: (1) the
HTLC between Alice and Berto, where Alice pays 0.1 BTC
to Berto if Berto demonstrates to know R within a certain
timelock, e.g., three days; (2) the HTLC between Berto and
Carola, where Berto pays 0.1 BTC to Carola if Carola demon-
strates to know Rwithin two days; and (3) the HTLC between
Carola and Davide, where Carola pays 0.1 BTC to Davide if
Davide demonstrates to know R within one day.
7) HTLC FULFILLMENT
Alice sends R to Davide, and HTLCs from Davide to Alice
are fulfilled: Davide shows R to Carola within one day, and
Carola pays him 0.1 BTC; Carola shows R to Berto within
two days, and Berto pays her 0.1 BTC; Berto shows R to
Alice within three days, and Alice pays him 0.1 BTC. At the
end, 0.1 BTC has been transferred from Alice to Davide.
For their work of forwarding the payment, Berto and Carola
can withhold a small fee when transferring the payment
(which, for simplicity, we omitted in this example). It is
important to highlight that all the described operations are
performed off-chain, without the need to interact with the
blockchain. Finally, it is worth noticing that, from Davide
to Alice, HTLCs have increasing timelocks. This ensures
that each party has enough time to know R and claim her
funds: Davide shows R to Carola in one day, Carola pays
0.1 BTC to Davide; after that, Carola still has one day to
claim 0.1 BTC fromBerto, as the timelock with Berto is set to
two days.
8) HTLC FAILURE
In the case R is never revealed, HTLCs must be failed and,
after the timelock expiration, funds of the HTLC return to the
payer in each channel. If Davide does not reveal R, after one
day, when the timelock expires, Carola gets back the funds
of the HTLC. This can be done cooperatively with Davide,
by creating a new commitment transaction off-chain; instead,
if Davide is not cooperative, Carola can send the most recent
commitment to the blockchain and close the channel. Then
Carola propagates back the failure, so that the HTLCs in all
the other involved channels are failed. It is important to notice
that, if R is not revealed, funds in the HTLC stay locked up to
the timelock expiration.
FIGURE 1. CLoTH simulator data structures.
III. THE CLoTH Simulator
In [10] we introduced CLoTH, the simulator for HTLC pay-
ment channel networks we developed.1 In this Section we
recap the main features of the simulator, necessary to under-
stand the remainder of the paper (for the complete details,
we refer to our previous paper). Moreover, we list the updates
we recently made to the simulator and we illustrate the related
work.
CLoTH is a discrete-event simulator. As input, it takes
a definition of an HTLC network and a payment script to
be played during simulation. It simulates payments in the
HTLC network by locally running a discrete-event mapping
of lnd – one of the implementation of the Lightning Network
protocol. It produces performance measures in the form of
payment-related statistics (e.g., the probability of payment
failures and the mean payment complete time).
The computation flow of the simulator is constituted by
three phases, herein briefly described: pre-processing phase,
simulation phase, post-processing phase.
A. PRE-PROCESSING PHASE
The pre-processing phase serves for generating the HTLC
PCN and the payments which are executed in the network
during the simulation phase.
The payment channel network and the payments are rep-
resented in the simulator with the data structures in Figure 1.
A channel connects two node (each one represented by
an ID) and has a certain capacity. In addition, since a channel
is bidirectional, namely, payments can traverse it both from
node1 to node2 and from node2 to node1, it contains
two edges, each one representing a direction of the channel.
An edge contains: the ID of the channel the edge belongs
to; the available balance in the direction represented by the
edge; base and proportional fee, which constitute the fee
required for forwarding a payment in the direction of the
edge (proportional fee is the part of the fee which depends
on the payment amount, while base fee is the constant fee
applied regardless of the payment amount); the timelock set
in the HTLCs established in the direction of the edge; and
the minimum value allowed for payments forwarded in the
direction of the edge. A payment is described by a sender, a
receiver, the payment amount and the payment start time, that
is the instant in which the payment occurs in the simulator.
There are two possible input modes for populating the
simulator data structures:
1The code of the simulator in pre-alpha is available online at
https://researchdata.nexacenter.org/payment-network-simulator/cloth-
0.0.2.zip
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TABLE 1. CLoTH simulator input parameters.
FIGURE 2. CLoTH simulator events state diagram.
1) by directly providing a complete specification of each
attribute of the data structures;
2) by providing a few input parameters that statistically
define an HTLC network and a script of payments to
be simulated. In this case, the network and payment
generator engines of the simulator generate through
random variables an instance of HTLC network and
an instance of payment script that match the input
description.
Table 1 shows input parameters of the simulator with their
symbols. Here follows an explanation of the parameters used
for simulations in this paper:
• rpi is the average number of payments per second.
In particular, the payment inter-arrival time is modeled
as a negative exponential random distribution.
• σa tunes payment amounts. It is the width of the Gaus-
sian distribution whose tail is used to choose the orders
of magnitude of payment amounts. The greater the width
is, the higher the payment amounts.
B. SIMULATION PHASE
During the simulation phase, the simulator simulates the
execution of the input-defined payments in the input-defined
HTLC network; in particular, the simulator runs a discrete-
event simulation.
In the CLoTH simulator, an event represents a state of a
payment. An event is generated each time a payment changes
its state according to the state diagram in Figure 2, and it
is processed by a function of the same name of the event.
For example, the event ‘‘find route’’ represents a payment for
TABLE 2. CLoTH simulator performance measures.
which a route has to be found. When such event is extracted
from the queue, a function of the same name is called, which
searches for a payment route. If the route is found, a ‘‘send
payment’’ event is generated for that payment, which repre-
sents the state of a payment that has to be sent by the payment
sender.
Payments are routed in the network using HTLCs, as spec-
ified by the Lightning Network protocol. The simulator func-
tions are amap of the functions oflnd, the implementation of
the Lightning Network taken as reference for implementing
CLoTH: the completeness of themapping ensures the validity
of simulation results.
C. POST-PROCESSING PHASE
At the end of the simulation phase, the simulator produces
per-payment data (e.g., the result -failure or success- of a
payment, the payment end time). The post-processing phase
of the simulator transforms those data into statistically mean-
ingful performance measures, by leveraging the batch means
method [19].
Table 2 shows the performance measures produced
by the simulator with their symbols. Here follow some
clarifications:
• Pfr is the probability that a payment fails due to the
absence of a route connecting sender and receiver.
• Pfb is the probability that a payment fails because a
channel in the route was unbalanced (namely, its balance
was lower than the payment amount) and an alternative
route without the unbalanced channel is not found.
• Pfc¯ is the probability that a payment fails because a node
in the route was uncooperative and an alternative route
is not found.
• Pt¯ is the probability that a payment fails because it took
more than a timeout of 60 seconds to complete.
• Pk¯ represents the remaining fraction of payments for
which we do not knowwhether they failed or succeeded,
as they ended after the time validity window of our
simulation. For example, this category can encompass
payments delayed after a long timelock, as a node
was uncooperative after establishing the HTLC for the
payment.
• T is the mean time for a successful payment to complete.
• Natt is the mean number of times a successful payment
is re-attempted.
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• Lr is the mean route length traversed by a successful
payment.
D. CLoTH UPDATED VERSION
The simulations in this paper are run using an updated version
of CLoTH with respect to the one used in our previous
paper [10]. The updated version reflect a newer version of
lnd, namely, lnd-v0.5-beta. The main changes with
respect to the previous version are:
• A payment fails if it does not complete within a timeout
of 60 seconds.
• Nodes and edges that are blacklisted during a payment
attempt (e.g., because an edge has not sufficient bal-
ance), are removed from the blacklist after five minutes
and five seconds respectively.
• The minimum HTLC channel policy is introduced.
• Dijkstra’s algorithm considers also channel fees as dis-
tance metric (while in the previous version of lnd con-
sidered only timelocks).
E. RELATED WORK
Several works in the literature analyzed payment channel
networks through simulations.
In [20], the author proposes and evaluates through sim-
ulations a routing protocol for payment channel networks.
The authors of the Flare routing protocol [9] run simulations
with 100,000 nodes to study the performance of the proto-
col. In [21] Piatkivskyi et al. developed a Lightning Network
simulator called Blyskavka to evaluate their approach of
splitting payments when routing them in LN. It is a multi-
agent discrete-event based simulator built for general pur-
pose payment network simulations; it also simulates HTLCs.
In [22], Ruozhou Yu et al. implemented a simulator to
evaluate CoinExpress, their proposed payment routing mech-
anisms for payment channel networks. The simulator is a pay-
ment channel network simulator based on network simulator
ns-3. Stasi et al. [23] developed a simulator to evaluate their
proposed improvements to the LN protocol: a novel fee policy
that aims at reducing channel unbalancing; and a multipath
routing payment scheme. Finally, Reynolds [24] developed
ocalm code for basic simulations on LN.
Differently from all the above-mentioned simulators,
CLoTH is a complete and precise mapping of the Lightning
Network code. The functions of lnd implementing the modi-
fied version of Dijkstra’s algorithm and the HTLC routing are
exactly implemented also in CLoTH. This is the key feature
of CLoTH which make it different from the other simulators
and this ensures the validity of the results produced by the
simulator.
IV. STUDY DESIGN
In all the simulations discussed in this paper, a recent snap-
shot2 of the Lightning Network is taken into consideration.
2Downloaded on February 12nd 2019 at 16:36 CET from
https://rompert.com/recksplorer/
FIGURE 3. A graphical view of the Lightning Network on February 12nd,
2019.
TABLE 3. Channel policies in the Lightning Network.
In this Section we present: the main features of the Light-
ning Network at that snapshot (Section IV-A); exploratory
simulations conducted on that snapshot to establish the
interval of the independent variables of the simulations
(Section IV-B); the design of the simulations presented in this
work (Section IV-C).
In this and in the remaining Sections, only the most rele-
vant simulation results are showed. The complete results are
available in Appendix .
A. FEATURES OF THE LIGHTNING NETWORK
Figure 3 is a graphical view of the Lightning Network on
February 12nd, 2019. Size of nodes is directly proportional
to their number of open channels. The network presents the
following characteristics:
• Number of nodes with at least one open channel: 3148;
• Number of channels: 24683;
• Mean and standard deviation of channel capacity:
0.0267 BTC (mean), 0.04361 BTC (standard deviation).
Table 3 shows the values of the channel policies in the
LN. For each policy, the table shows also the default value
set when opening a channel with the lnd client. Monetary
policies are expressed in millisatoshis.3
31 satoshi corresponds to 10−8 bitcoin.
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FIGURE 4. Payment success probability varying payment rate rpi .
B. SIMULATION INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
This Section presents exploratory simulations conducted on
the LN with the goal of defining the variation intervals of the
independent variables.
The possible independent variables considered for the sim-
ulations of this paper are: payment amounts tuner σa; and
payment rate rpi . The other simulator input parameters are
not considered as independent variables for the following
reasons:
• The network parameters are the ones of the snapshot of
the Lightning Network.
• The probabilities of uncooperative nodes are fixed to
zero, since the uncooperative behavior of nodes is not
under observation in the simulations of this work.
• The percentage of same-recipient payment is fixed to
zero, since the network behavior in the scenario of
payments directed to only a few nodes is studied by
simulations in Section VII.
In the following we show the exploratory simulations
through which we define the variation intervals of rpi and σa.
1) PAYMENT RATE VARIATION INTERVAL
We conduct exploratory simulations on the Lightning Net-
work varying payment rate from 10 payments per second
to 100 payments per second. The payment amounts tuner
σa is fixed and payment amounts are uniformly distributed
between 1 and 105 satoshis: the lower limit is the minimum
allowed HTLC amount set by default in channel policy,
the higher limit is chosen to avoid payments higher than the
average channel capacity of the LN.
As results in Figure 4 show, payment success probabil-
ity is around 88% for each payment rate. As Table 6 in
Appendix shows, the most significant reasons of failures are:
mainly insufficient channel capacities for routing payments
of the highest amounts; unbalancing of channels. However,
it can be noticed that payment rate does not significantly
impact performance: payment success probability remain
almost the same for each payment rate. Therefore, for the
simulations in this work, we use a fixed payment rate of
TABLE 4. Ratio of payments with a certain order of magnitude for each
value of σa.
FIGURE 5. Payment success probability varying payment amounts σa.
100 payments per second. We choose this value because it
constitutes the middle order of magnitude between 10 pay-
ments per second - the Bitcoin transaction rate which the
Lightning Network is supposed to overcome - and 1000 pay-
ments per second - the payment rate of well-established
payment systems that the Lightning Network aspires to reach
in the future [12].
2) PAYMENT AMOUNTS VARIATION INTERVAL
The orders of magnitude of payment amounts are chosen
between 1 and 105 satoshis: the minimum is chosen because
the default minimum HTLC policy is 1 satoshi, therefore
payments lower than 1 satoshi would almost certainly fail;
the maximum is chosen to avoid to produce payments higher
than the average channel capacity of the LN.
The amount tuner σa sets the distribution of payment
amounts in the above-defined orders of magnitude. To define
the limits of the variation interval of σa, we proceeded as
follows: the lower limit of σa is set to 1, because this value
produces almost all payments of the lowest amount possible
(1 satoshi); the upper limit is chosen via simulations on the
LN . In these simulations, σa is increased until the probability
of payment success goes below 90%. This is to avoid to use
values of σa for which it is already known that they cause
low performance. Table 4 shows the distribution of payment
amounts for each value of the variation interval of σa defined
as above.
Figure 5 shows the results of the above-discussed simu-
lations on the LN varying σa. The probability of payment
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success goes below 90% for σa= 8.0, so this value is cho-
sen as upper limit of the variation interval. When σa= 1,
the probability of payment success is 99.81% and the only
reason of payment failures is for absence of route. While
increasing σa, the failures for no route increase and some
failures are also due to unbalancing and to payment timeout
expiration. In general, as Table 7 in Appendix shows the
most occurring reason for failures is the absence of route
(around 8%); channel unbalancing, instead, is the cause of
around 2% for the highest values of σa analyzed. The reason
of this behavior is that payments with increasing amounts do
not find a route with sufficient channel capacities, and also
cause channel unbalancing.
C. SIMULATIONS DESIGN
In this paper we present three groups of simulations con-
ducted on the snapshot of the Lightning Network described
in Section IV-A.
1) Simulations on hubs. We remove from the Lightning
Network the hubs, i.e., the nodes with the highest
number of channels. We run simulations giving the
networks without those nodes as input to CLoTH. The
goal is to understand whether the Lightning Network is
resilient to the removal of the hubs.
2) Simulations on rebalancing. We implement in the sim-
ulator two separate approaches aiming at rebalancing
channels. We run simulations to study the effectiveness
of the approaches at reducing payment failures for
unbalanced channels.
3) Simulations on service providers.We simulate a typical
use case of the Lightning Network, in which a few
service providers receive payments from the remaining
network nodes. Therefore in the Lightning Network we
configure three classes of nodes: payees only (the ser-
vice providers), payers only and hybrid payees/payers.
We run simulations giving in input to CLoTH the Light-
ning Network with the classes of nodes.
V. HUBS
In this Section we discuss a set of simulations which ana-
lyze the Lightning Network performance when hubs of the
network are removed. The goal is to understand how hubs
influence the LN.
A. IDENTIFICATION OF HUBS
In network science, a hub is a node characterized by an high
degree [25], i.e., an high number of connections. Specifically,
in this work we identify as hubs the first six nodes of the LN
ordered by number of channels. Figure 6 is the bar plot of
the number of channels per node in decreasing order for the
first 50 most connected nodes.We identify the first 6 nodes as
hubs: this is justified by the fact that there is the highest step
between the sixth and the seventh node (the seventh node has
159 less channels than the sixth). The chosen hubs have in
total 4695 channels, that constitute around 20% of the total
FIGURE 6. Number of channels per node of the first 50 most connected
LN nodes.
number of channels in the LN. Those nodes became hubs
for different reasons. For instance, some of them incentivized
nodes to open a channel with them by promising low-fee
channels, or by simplifying the channel opening procedure.
B. SIMULATION STRATEGY
The simulation strategy adopted for studying the influence
of hubs in the network consists in disconnecting one-by-one
the hubs and in running a simulation on the resulting network
without those hubs. From the considered snapshot of the LN,
the first hub (the one having the highest number of channels)
is removed with all its channels and a simulation is run on the
network without that hub. Then, from the network without the
first hub, the second hub is removed and a simulation is run
on the resulting network (namely, the LN lacking of the first
and second hub). The same process is repeated until all six
hubs are removed.
The only independent variable of these simulations is the
number of disconnected hubs, as the objective of the simula-
tions is to analyze their impact on performance. The payment
amount parameter σa is fixed to 4, that represents the middle
of its variation interval defined in Section IV-B.
1) SIMULATION RESULTS
Figure 7 shows the probability of payment success when
varying the number of hubs removed from the LN. As already
mentioned, in each simulation σa is fixed to 4 (see Table 4 for
the corresponding distribution of payment amounts).
The payment success rate is not significantly affected by
the presence of hubs: when all the hubs and their channels
are connected, such rate is 95.2%, while when all hubs are
disconnected, it is 94.98%, that means a decrease of around
0.2%. Such decrease is entirely due to payments not finding
a route.
The most visible -and expected- effect resulting from hubs
removal is a slight increase of the average route length,
as Figure 8 shows: from 3.34 to 3.62 number of hops.
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FIGURE 7. Payment success probability when removing hubs in the
Lightning Network.
FIGURE 8. Average payment route length when removing hubs in the
Lightning Network.
VI. REBALANCING
In this Section, we describe two different rebalancing
approaches, whose objective is to rebalance channels, thus
avoiding that payments fail because of unbalanced chan-
nels. After implementing the rebalancing approaches in
the simulator, we run simulations to understand whether
the approaches are effective, namely, whether they suc-
ceed in reducing the probability of failures for unbalancing.
We design two different rebalancing approaches: active and
passive rebalancing.
A. ACTIVE REBALANCING
The active rebalancing consists in executing a payment with
the purpose of rebalancing channels. If a node has a channel
with low balance and also another channel with high balance,
it makes a rebalancing payment, which transfers funds from
its high-balance channel to its low-balance channel.
Consider the situation in Figure 9. In the channel with
Carola, Alice has low balance (10% of the total channel
capacity), while in the channel with Berto she has high
balance (90% of the total channel capacity). Therefore, she
executes a rebalancing payment that moves 0.4 BTC from
FIGURE 9. Rebalancing payment in the active rebalancing approach.
the channel with Berto to the channel with Carola. In this
way, the channel with Carola will result balanced, as she and
Carola own both 50% of the total channel capacity.
The active rebalancing implemented in the simulator is
triggered when a channel balance goes below 20% of the total
channel capacity. The amount transferred with the rebalanc-
ing payment is the amount necessary to increase the channel
balance up to the 50% of the channel capacity.
The active rebalancing approach fails in the following
cases:
• When the node with a low-balance channel does not
have any candidate channel for rebalancing. The candi-
date channel must satisfy two conditions: (i) the node’s
balance in that channel must be greater than half of the
total channel capacity; (ii) the node’s balance in that
channel must be sufficient to transfer the rebalancing
payment amount.
• When the rebalancing payment fails for no route (in the
example of Figure 9, if there is no route between Berto
and Carola).
• When the rebalancing payment fails because there is not
enough balance in the channels of the found route (in the
example of Figure 9, when one or more channels in the
route between Berto and Carola have balance lower than
0.4 BTC).
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that rebalancing pay-
ments are executed instantly and no fees are charged to them.
B. PASSIVE REBALANCING
The passive rebalancing consists in adjusting the fee policy of
a channel according to the channel balance, in a way that fee
amount is inversely proportional to channel balance. There-
fore, this approach encourages payments to traverse channels
with high balance. In fact, the Dijkstra’s algorithm used for
finding a route for a payment tends to prefer routes with
lower fees: therefore, if the fee of a channel is kept inversely
proportional to the channel balance, payments should tend to
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FIGURE 10. Probability of payment failures for unbalancing with/without
active rebalancing varying payment amounts σa.
traverse channels with high balance and to avoid channels
with low balance. A linear function is used to map channel
balance to channel fee policy.
C. SIMULATION STRATEGY
To study the effectiveness of the rebalancing approaches
discussed, we run simulations using a version of the simulator
that implements the approach under observation. For each
rebalancing approach, multiple simulations are conducted
varying σa. The above-discussed snapshot of the LN is given
in input to the simulator in these simulations.
1) SIMULATION RESULTS
a: ACTIVE REBALANCING
Figure 10 shows the probability of payment failures for unbal-
ancing when active rebalancing is implemented, compared
with the case in which no rebalancing approach is imple-
mented.
As it can be noticed, the difference of the two cases is
slight: the probability of payment failures are almost the same
in both cases.
The low effectiveness of the active rebalancing is due
to the fact that most of the attempts of rebalancing fail.
Table 5 shows, for each value of the payment amount tuner
σa, the total number of active rebalancing attempts, the per-
centage of succeeded and the percentages of failed for each
of the three causes explained above (absence of a candidate
channel for unbalancing, failure of the rebalancing payment
for no route, failure of the rebalancing payment for no bal-
ance). The Table shows that for any σa, just few rebalancing
attempts succeed: at maximum around 16%. The majority of
attempts fail because there is not enough balance to transfer
the rebalancing payments; a substantial part also fails because
a candidate channel from which executing the rebalancing
payment is not found.
From that follows that the active rebalancing approach
implemented is not effective for two reasons: mainly because
channels with not sufficient balance in the network cause
TABLE 5. Rebalancing attempts.
FIGURE 11. Probability of payment failures for unbalancing with/without
passive rebalancing varying payment amounts σa.
failures of the rebalancing payments; secondarily, because a
candidate channel for executing the rebalancing payment is
not found.
b: PASSIVE REBALANCING
Figure 11 shows the probabilities of failures for unbalancing
with and without the passive rebalancing approach. Passive
rebalancing is more effective than active rebalancing: the
probability of failures for unbalancing is lower than the case
without rebalancing for any value of σa.In particular, failures
for unbalancing decrease of about one fourth in each case
when passive rebalancing is implemented.
Passive rebalancing causes also a slight increase of failures
for no route, as results in Appendix show (Table 10). The
reason for such increase is that certain payments must pay
higher fees than in the case without passive rebalancing:
these payments fail when there are not sufficient capacities
in the channels for transferring the payment amounts plus
the increased fees. However, the decrease of failures for no
balance is greater with respect to the increase of failures for
no route, hence passive rebalancing is still effective.
VII. SERVICE PROVIDERS
In this Section the LN is studied in the service-providers
scenario. The service-providers scenario is a typical case of
use of the Lightning Network, in which a few nodes in the
network (service providers) are payees only, as they are paid
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for their services. The majority of network nodes, instead, are
payers only, as they send payments to the service providers.
The goal of the simulations in the service-providers sce-
nario is to understand whether the LN can support this typical
case of use in which most of the payments are directed to only
few service-providers nodes.
A. CLASSES OF NODES
To configure the scenario, three classes of nodes are set in
the LN:
• Payees: they represent the service providers, namely,
nodes that only receive payments. They are nodes
directly connected to one of the six hubs of the
LN (according to the identification of hub made in
Section V). The reason of this choice is that it is con-
venient for a service provider to be connected to a hub,
as also many other nodes are connected to the hub and
therefore their payments can easily reach the provider.
Service providers are expected to be a minority, so pay-
ees are 10% of the nodes directly connected to a hub.
In addition, each payee is chosen in a way that, in the
channel with the hub, the hub’s balance is higher than
the payee’s balance, to avoid that payments directed to
the payee through the hub fail for not sufficient balance.
Payees are in total 188 nodes.
• Payers: they are the nodes than only send payments. For
the same reason of having an efficient connection to the
service providers, also payers are directly connected to
a hub. Therefore, they constitute the remaining nodes
directly connected to a hubwhich are not payers: in total,
they are 1781.
• Hybrid nodes: they are nodes that both send and receive
payments. they are the remaining nodes of the LNwhich
do not belong to the categories of payees and payers:
they are in total 1179 nodes.
In the simulations on the LN where the above-defined
classes of nodes are set, 80% of the simulated payments flow
from payers to payees, while the rest is exchanged among
hybrid nodes, in order to preserve a certain level of traffic in
the network not directed to the service providers.
B. SIMULATION STRATEGY
To study the performance of the LN in the service-providers
scenario, multiple simulations are run varying σa in
the defined interval. The snapshot of the LN with the
above-defined classes of node is given in input to the sim-
ulator in each simulation.
1) SIMULATION RESULTS
Figure 12 shows the probabilities of payment success of the
simulations in the service-providers scenario, comparing it
to the normal scenario (where no classes of nodes are set in
the LN).
It can be noticed that, as payment amounts increase,
the success rate in the service-provider scenario decreases,
FIGURE 12. Payment success probability in the service-providers scenario
varying payment amounts σa.
FIGURE 13. Average payment attempts in the service-providers scenario
varying payment amounts σa.
up to around 66%. The main reason of payment failures is
channel unbalancing, which in the worst case (in correspon-
dence to the highest σa) reaches a probability of around 26%
(see results in Appendix , Table 11). Such high probability
of failures is due to the fact that, since payments are mostly
directed to a few nodes, channels connecting to the nodes
become unbalanced.
For this same reason, it can be noticed an increase of
average payment attempts necessary before a payment suc-
ceeds, as Figure 13 shows. In fact, since payments bump into
unbalanced channels, they must be re-attempted more and
more times.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The Lightning Network is the most promising solution to
the well-known blockchain scalability issue. In this work we
conducted simulations on the LN using CLoTH, an HTLC
payment channel network simulator that we developed. The
purpose was to investigate the effects of hubs, rebalancing
approaches and service providers in the Lightninig Network.
Simulations on rebalancing have found that our passive
rebalancing approach based on fee adjustment reduces by one
fourth the probability of failures for unbalancing. Simulations
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on hubs revealed that the LN is resilient to the removal of six
hubs, as the probability of payment success decreases only
by 0.2% when all the hubs are removed. Finally, simulations
on the service-provider scenario have shown that up to 26%
of payments fail because channel directing to the service
providers become unbalanced.
Our work shed new light on some capabilities and limita-
tions of the Lightning Network: its resilience to the removal
of hubs and a scarce performance in the service-providers
scenario. In addition, we proposed an effective rebalancing
approach which can be implemented in the LN protocol to
address channel unbalancing.
Still, our work presents some limitations that will be
addressed by future work. Both passive and active chan-
nel rebalancing approaches will be further investigated: to
improve passive rebalancing, different non-linear fee-balance
mapping functions will be tested, while to make active
rebalancing effective, the algorithm will re-attempt failed
rebalancing payments, possibly until they succeed. Further
simulations will be conducted to understand whether the
proposed rebalancing approaches can address channel unbal-
ancing also in the service-provider scenario.
In addition, we will analyze the Lightning Network from
the perspective of graph theory. For instance, instead of using
the simulator itself for establishing the variation intervals
of independent variables, measures like maximum flow will
be used to define the limits of simulated payment amounts.
Moreover, eigenvector centrality and other centrality mea-
sures will be used to identify the most central network nodes:
similarly to the simulations on hubs, simulations will be
run on the Lightning Network without the identified central
nodes.
Finally, we plan to introduce the blockchain in CLoTH in
order to study the interaction between the payment channel
network and the blockchain (specifically, the opening and




Tables 6 to 11 show the complete results of the simulations
presented in this paper. Each Table shows the independent
TABLE 6. Complete simulation results varying payment rate.
TABLE 7. Complete simulation results varying payment amounts.
TABLE 8. Complete simulation results varying number of hubs
removed Nn¯.
TABLE 9. Complete simulation results with active rebalancing.
TABLE 10. Complete simulation results with passive rebalancing.
variable and the output performance measures (Pk¯ and Pfc¯ are
omitted since they are always zero). Only the mean values
of the performance measures are presented; the complete
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TABLE 11. Complete simulation results in the service-providers scenario.
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